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Abstract
The brain is composed of electrically excitable neuronal networks regulated by the activity of voltage-gated
ion channels. Further portraying the molecular composition of the brain, however, will not reveal anything
remotely reminiscent of a feeling, a sensation or a conscious experience. In classical physics, addressing
the mind–brain problem is a formidable task because no physical mechanism is able to explain how the
brain generates the unobservable, inner psychological world of conscious experiences and how in turn those
conscious experiences steer the underlying brain processes toward desired behavior. Yet, this setback does
not establish that consciousness is non-physical. Modern quantum physics affirms the interplay between two
types of physical entities in Hilbert space: unobservable quantum states, which are vectors describing what
exists in the physical world, and quantum observables, which are operators describing what can be observed
in quantum measurements. Quantum no-go theorems further provide a framework for studying quantum
brain dynamics, which has to be governed by a physically admissible Hamiltonian. Comprising consciousness
of unobservable quantum information integrated in quantum brain states explains the origin of the inner
privacy of conscious experiences and revisits the dynamic timescale of conscious processes to picosecond
conformational transitions of neural biomolecules. The observable brain is then an objective construction
created from classical bits of information, which are bound by Holevo’s theorem, and obtained through
the measurement of quantum brain observables. Thus, quantum information theory clarifies the distinction
between the unobservable mind and the observable brain, and supports a solid physical foundation for
consciousness research.
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Highlights
• Psychological inner world remains private and unobservable from a third-person perspective.
• Physiological brain activity due to electric excitations of neuronal networks is observable.
• Quantum information theory makes a distinction between physical states and observables.
• Unobservable quantum information built in quantum brain states comprises consciousness.
• The observable brain is constructed from bits of information constrained by Holevo’s theorem.
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The essence of consciousness is experience (Nagel, 1974, 1987, 2012). Through conscious experiences
such as the perceived colors of the rainbow, the pleasant sound of a musical instrument, the fresh smell of
the sea breeze, or the wet touch of the water, we access the surrounding physical world and become aware of
our own bodies (Georgiev, 2017). The introspective access to our conscious experiences is privately reserved
only for us from a subjective, phenomenal, first-person perspective, and it is denied to others who happen to
observe us from an objective, third-person perspective (Nagel, 1974, 1987, 2012). It is an empirical fact that
the very process of observation of someone else’s brain does not elicit in us experiences that are identical with
those experienced by the observed brain (Georgiev, 2020). Consequently, we do not have at our disposal
an objective method to determine whether any other living or non-living physical system is conscious or
not. The unobservability of conscious experiences does not prevents us from being able to specify the
particular subject whose experiences we are talking about, or to characterize the physical circumstances
under which certain conscious experiences are elicited (Georgiev, 2017, 2020); for example, dolphins’ double
sonar experience of reflected ultrasound waves used for hunting prey or orientation in their natural habitat
(Starkhammar et al., 2011; Branstetter et al., 2012; Jensen et al., 2013; Ridgway et al., 2015; Ladegaard
et al., 2019). But this is the most we can do. We are unable to describe in words and communicate to
others what it is like to have those experiences. Thus, conscious experiences are fundamentally unobservable
and their phenomenal qualia are incommunicable (Georgiev, 2020). Since we have direct access to our own
conscious experiences, we know that there is at least one conscious entity in the physical universe. From our
shared evolutionary ancestry with other humans or animal species (Darwin, 2006; Dawkins, 2004; Stringer
& Galway-Witham, 2017; Hublin et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2019), we also have solid scientific grounds to
maintain that we are not the only conscious entity in existence. Therefore, the primary aim of a physical
theory of consciousness is to provide criteria that will allow unambiguous specification of which physical
systems are conscious and which are not. Once the conscious mind is physically identified, the physical
laws will regulate how the mind affects the world (Georgiev, 2017). It should be noted that consciousness,
conscious experience, conscious state, mental state and mind are used interchangeably throughout this work.
A mental process (conscious process) is a process that involves a sequence of mental states (i.e. dynamically
changing conscious experiences).
The seat of the human mind is the brain cortex. Cortical electric activity is mainly due to excitation of
principal pyramidal neurons, which comprise over 70% of all cortical neurons (Fig. 1). Pyramidal neurons
were designated as the ‘psychic cells’ of the brain by the father of modern neuroscience Ramón y Cajal since
their electric activities instantiate feelings (Goldman-Rakic, 2002). Substantial medical evidence supports
a cohesive relationship between the brain cortical electric excitation and the conscious mind because direct
electric stimulation of the brain cortex elicits sensations (Bosking et al., 2017b; Hiremath et al., 2017; Yoshor
et al., 2007), whereas discrete cortical lesions impair cognitive abilities or change the way one experiences
the world (Chen et al., 2017; Hadid & Lepore, 2017; Sajja et al., 2017; Lau & London, 2018). For example,
direct electric stimulation of the visual cortex through implanted electrodes that deliver digitized signals
captured by a camera is capable of restoring the vision in blind patients whose eyes were injured by trauma
(Dobelle, 2000; Bosking et al., 2017a; Lewis & Rosenfeld, 2016), while various injuries to the occipital lobe
of the cortex produce blindness (Hadid & Lepore, 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Sajja et al., 2017). Apparently,
the mind and the brain are not identical, because anesthetized brains do not generate conscious experiences.
In the course of general anesthesia consciousness is erased by the pharmacological action of the anesthetic
drug, yet the experimenter may stimulate with visible light the open eyes of anesthetized animals and still
evoke electric potentials by pyramidal neurons located in the primary visual cortex (Lamme et al., 1998;
Imas et al., 2005; Sellers et al., 2015; Hudetz & Imas, 2007). Similar experiments in anesthetized human
subjects showed evoked electroencephalographic (McNeer et al., 2009) or electrocorticographic (Nourski
et al., 2017) responses under auditory stimulation. If mind states were related to brain states through one-
to-one correspondence (logical identity relation), it should not have been possible to turn mental states on
or off using general anesthetics, because the brain states would have always remained mental states. Thus,
the mind–brain problem is to explain how the unobservable conscious mind and the observable brain relate






Figure 1: The mind–brain problem. Neither the brain cortex whose anatomy can be observed during an open skull surgery,
nor the cortical electric activity recorded by electroencephalography (EEG) resemble the visual conscious experience elicited
by observation of a red rose. Explaining the physical relationship between the observable brain and the unobservable mind has
troubled philosophers for centuries. Modified from Georgiev (2020).
The unobservability and incommunicability of conscious experiences has been marshaled as evidence for
the nonphysical nature of consciousness (Robinson, 1976; Jackson, 1982, 1986; Sprigge, 1994; Chalmers,
1995, 1996; Zhao, 2012) and the alleged inadequacy of physics to answer questions related to our mentality
and sentience (Nagel, 1965; Kim, 1998; Campbell & Bickhard, 2011). Such a view is often grounded in
the principles of classical physics according to which everything inside the physical world is observable,
governed by deterministic physical laws, and causally closed in regard to its time dynamics with respect to
non-physical entities (Susskind & Hrabovsky, 2013).
Classical reductionism fails because reductive identification of unobservable consciousness with observable
physical properties is logically inconsistent. According to the postulates of classical physics (including
classical mechanics, electromagnetism, and Einstein’s theory of relativity) all existing things are physical
and all physical entities are observable. In other words, by logical contraposition, it follows that if an
entity is not observable, then it is not physical and does not exist. In the precise mathematical language
of set theory, non-existing entities such as unicorns, centaurs or fairies, are all members of the empty set.
Therefore, identifying the unobservable consciousness with any non-observable non-existing entity would be
logically equivalent to classical eliminativism (Dennett, 1991) according to which consciousness does not
exist and is a member of the empty set. Here, our goal is not to ban consciousness from existence, but to
incorporate it into the physical description of the world.
The obstacles faced by classical reductionism compel many philosophers and neuroscientists to reject
the postulate that all existing things are physical thereby assuming that the brain generates existing, but
non-physical, non-observable conscious experiences, and consciousness is a functional product emerging out
of the underlying brain activity (Fodor, 1981; Baars, 2005; Piccinini, 2010; Wenzel et al., 2019). Classical
functionalism, however, also fails due to the closure of the physical world to non-physical entities. The
conscious mind, if viewed as a functional product or an emergent property of the brain, can only be admitted
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as an epiphenomenon without any causal influence on physical events (Jackson, 1982), hence providing no
basis for natural selection and no evolutionary advantage to conscious organisms in the fight for survival
(Georgiev, 2013, 2019; Popper & Eccles, 1983). The adequate match between our conscious experiences, the
neural responses, and the corresponding behavior, provides compelling evidence against epiphenomenalism.
For example, the neural responses to detrimental factors are always associated with unpleasant feelings and
avoiding behavior. If conscious experiences are causally effective, the evolution theory is able to explain the
adequate matching between the unpleasant experiences, the avoiding behavior and the negative influence of
detrimental factors upon the organism. Clearly, those animals that would have enjoyed detrimental factors
would not have avoided dangers, thereby dying out in the competition with rival organisms. However,
if conscious experiences were causally ineffective, the evolutionary explanation would fail since one would
expect that in nature still there will be organisms that experience pleasant feelings when being injured but
avoid detrimental factors due to the organization of their neural processes (James, 1879). Introspectively,
we could verify that we never enjoy detrimental factors, hence epiphenomenalism and classical functionalism
have to be false.
To avoid the charge of epiphenomenalism, consciousness has to be physical, thereby entering directly into
the mathematical equations of the fundamental physical laws that describe the dynamics of physical systems
endowed with conscious experiences. Certainly, this requires a fundamental revision of the principles of
classical physics and incorporation of consciousness into a modern, non-classical physical theory. Fortunately,
in 1920s the failure of classical physics to describe faithfully the physical world was well-established: it
was unable to explain the stability of chemical atoms, the photoelectric effect, the electron diffraction
in crystals and the spectral curve of blackbody radiation (Fayngold & Fayngold, 2013). The concerted
efforts of quantum physicists have replaced the inadequate classical physics with a radically new, empirically
successful, quantum theory based not only on different physical equations, but also on conceptually distinct
quantum principles (Susskind & Friedman, 2014). Among the newly introduced concepts is the quantum
indeterminism, which endows elementary particles with the propensity to make choices among different
future possibilities available for actualization, and a dichotomy between what physically exists, described by
unobservable quantum state vectors, and what can be physically observed, described by observable quantum
operators. This dichotomy is crucial for addressing the mind–brain problem. Identifying the unobservable
consciousness with the quantum information integrated in unobservable quantum brain state vectors makes
consciousness causally effective in determining the probabilities for producing different quantum outcomes
upon measurement. The observable brain then is nothing but the classical record of observed outcomes of
brain quantum observables upon measurement with brain imaging devices (Georgiev, 2017).
In this present work, after briefly reviewing some preliminary background on the mind–brain problem to
make the exposition self-contained, we will focus on the quantum information theoretic differences between
the unobservable mind and the observable brain, and will elaborate on the Holevo bound, including its
explicit mathematical formulation and the physical conditions that maximize its value to n bits of classical
information for a system composed of n qubits.
2. Classical information-theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem
Even though quantum physics superseded classical physics a century ago, current neuroscience is still
based solely on classical principles. This conservative approach denies any essential role of quantum effects
in regard to consciousness and assumes that the brain processes related to the input, processing, storage
and output of classical information are sufficient to explain consciousness. Limiting quantum theory to a
narrow domain where quantum physical systems exhibit classical behavior, however, leads again to classical
functionalism, epiphenomenalism, and the infamous hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995).
The characteristic features of classical behavior are the observability and communicability of classical
information, and deterministic time evolution of physical states (Susskind & Hrabovsky, 2013). Classical
information encoded onto a physical carrier can be read and copied onto a new carrier. If in the process
of copying the old copy is preserved intact, classical information can be multiplied. Changing the nature
of the physical carriers (e.g. from massive electrons to massless photons) allows classical information to be
broadcast to a distant receiver where it is recorded and stored. The obtained classical information can be
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further processed using irreversible logic gates and/or erased. An illustrative example of classical information
is the digital string of bits, 0s and 1s, which encodes a text file on a computer hard disk drive. One can
display the text on a monitor and read it, copy the information contained in the digital file multiple times, or
even erase the file in order to free hard disk memory space (Georgiev, 2013). Thus, the physical properties
of classical information are ideal for memory storage and retrieval, namely, once memory traces are formed
in the brain, they can be read again and recalled at a later time. Observable classical information, however,
cannot lead to unobservable conscious experiences without assuming some form of functional emergence.
Functionally, neurons encode and transmit classical information in terms of electric spikes. Neuronal
electric activity is due to ionic fluxes through excitatory or inhibitory ion channels incorporated in the ex-
citable plasma membrane. Instrumental for most neurophysiological processes are sodium (Nav), potassium
(Kv) and calcium (Cav) voltage-gated ion channels, selectively conducting Na+, K+ or Ca2+ ions down the
respective ion concentration gradients (Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2014). The voltage sensing is performed
by an electrically charged 4th α-helix inside each domain of the α-subunit of ion channels (Fig. 2). Macro-
scopic electric currents flow through a rich repertoire of neuronal voltage-gated ion channels, whose opening
is regulated by the local voltage across the plasma membrane (Georgiev, 2015). As a result, the trans-
membrane voltage of neurons undergoes dynamical changes in time. Pyramidal neurons stay at rest if the
transmembrane voltage in the soma and the axon initial segment does not exceed a threshold value of about
−55 mV (Gasparini et al., 2004). When the voltage threshold is reached, the neuron fires a brief electric
spike that propagates down the axon in order to activate synapses innervating other target neurons. Glial
cells, including astrocytes and oligodendrocytes, maintain homeostasis of electrolytes and other biologically
active substances in the brain, thereby nourishing and nurturing the easily vulnerable neurons (Verkhratsky
& Nedergaard, 2017). With the use of electric spikes propagating within the neural network, the brain is
able to perform a variety of computational tasks. Yet, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why
neuronal computation in the brain generates any conscious experiences at all (Chalmers, 1995).
The hard problem of consciousness is a hallmark of functional theories of consciousness, in which conscious
experiences are assumed to be generated by the brain in the process of performing a certain kind of classical
function. Once the function is precisely specified, e.g. neuronal computation, it becomes impossible to
explain why it is the case that the brain does not operate in a mindless, nonconscious mode where the
neurons perform the specified function without any generation of conscious experiences. Thus, the hard
problem is an excellent test for epiphenomenal consciousness, namely, if the dynamics can be fully specified
in advance without any reference to consciousness, then the generated conscious experiences have to be
causally ineffective (Georgiev, 2017). Noteworthy, the hard problem does not occur for reductive theories
of consciousness, in which conscious experiences are identified with physical states. Indeed, if the logical
identity relation makes the mind equivalent to some physical state Ψ, it will be inconsistent to define
alternative physical worlds in which the state Ψ is not a mind.
3. Quantum information-theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem
Quantum information is a novel kind of information that is held in the quantum states of quantum
physical systems. Quantum information cannot be converted to classical information, which means that it is
not contained in the mathematical description of a quantum physical state Ψ, but it is held in the physically
existing substrate signified by Ψ. In other words, exactly as the map is not the territory, the quantum
physical state Ψ of, say, an electron written as a mathematical symbol on a sheet of paper is not the same as
the quantum state of the electron in the quantum physical reality. This needs to be properly understood if
one is to overcome the possible discomfort resulting from staring at quantum mechanical expressions for Ψ
while deriving mathematically, for example, that Ψ is not observable (Georgiev, 2017).
Quantum information differs from classical information in a number of striking ways, which we will
briefly review using Dirac’s bra-ket notation (Dirac, 1967). The two main quantum physical laws are given
by the Schrödinger equation (Hayashi et al., 2015), which governs what physically exists and how it changes






































































Figure 2: Morphology of a cortical pyramidal neuron (NeuroMorpho.org NMO 09565) with structural representation of voltage-
gated ion channels in a patch of the electrically excitable plasma membrane. The pyramidal neuron receives excitatory or
inhibitory synaptic inputs applied at the apical and basal dendrites or the soma. If the summated synaptic electric currents
depolarize the axon initial segment over the threshold value of −55 mV, the neuron discharges an action potential, which
propagates down the axon and initiates the release of neurotransmitter from terminal axonal boutons onto target neurons.
The electric activity of the neuron is mainly driven by ionic fluxes through sodium (Nav), potassium (Kv) and calcium (Cav)
voltage-gated ion channels. Individual Nav and Cav channels are composed of α-subunits with four protein domains (I–IV)
each, whereas Kv channels have disjoint protein domains into separate α-subunits. Each transmembrane channel domain is
formed by six α helices bundled in parallel. The electrically charged voltage sensor that gates the ion channel is located within
the 4th α-helix of each domain. Modified from Georgiev & Glazebrook (2014).
Schrödinger equation. The fabric of physical reality is woven from quantum probability amplitudes,




|Ψ(r, t)〉 = Ĥ |Ψ(r, t)〉 (1)
where ı is the imaginary unit, ~ is the reduced Planck constant, ∂∂t is the partial time derivative operator,
|Ψ(r, t)〉 is the quantum wavefunction, r = (x, y, z) is the vector of position coordinates, t is time, and Ĥ is
the Hamiltonian operator corresponding to the total energy of the quantum system (Georgiev, 2017, 2020).
The quantum wavefunction |Ψ(r, t)〉 of the physical system, which solves the Schrödinger equation, is
a continuous distribution in three-dimensional space. As a consequence of the linearity of the Schrödinger
equation, it follows that any two solutions |Ψ1(r, t)〉 and |Ψ2(r, t)〉 can be linearly superposed to form a new
solution
|Ψs(r, t)〉 = α1|Ψ1(r, t)〉+ α2|Ψ2(r, t)〉 (2)
where α1 and α2 are complex numbers satisfying the normalization condition |α1|2 + |α2|2 = 1. Due to the
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principle of quantum superposition, the quantum wavefunction |Ψ(r, t)〉 has the properties of a vector (and
behaves like a vector) in an abstract Hilbert space (Georgiev & Cohen, 2018).
Born rule. The value of the quantum wavefunction at a certain location (r, t) in space and time is a
complex number Ψ(r, t) known as quantum probability amplitude (Feynman, 1948; Feynman et al., 2013;
Feynman, 2014). According to the Born rule, the absolute square of the quantum probability amplitude
|Ψ(r, t)|2 determines the quantum probability for some physical event involving the quantum system of in-
terest to occur at the location with coordinates (r, t). Importantly, the behavior of the quantum system is
inherently indeterministic. If the exact state |Ψ(r, t)〉 of the quantum system is known through meticulous
preparation (post-selection), the quantum probabilities for occurrence of different physical events (observa-
tions) will still arise, not because of our ignorance of what the quantum state is, but due to the inherent
propensity of the quantum system to generate the observed outcomes under experimental measurement.
Even though the quantum physical laws may preclude prediction with absolute certainty of the future state
(or event) of a quantum system, they allow calculation of the probability for a given future state (or event) to
be actualized by the system. As a consequence of indeterminism, consciousness does not have to be epiphe-
nomenal in a quantum world and the origin of free will could be recognized in the process of actualization
of physical events compliant with the Born rule (Georgiev, 2013, 2017).
The main characteristic property of the quantum wavefunction |Ψ〉 is that it is not observable. Of
course, here we do not mean that the mathematical symbol |Ψ〉 typeset on paper is unobservable, but
rather that the physical entity to which |Ψ〉 refers to in reality is unobservable. Exactly because the
quantum information is fundamentally tied to its physical carrier, it is impossible for classical computers
to replicate the behavior of quantum physical systems. While classical waves could be easily observed
as ripples in a water tank, quantum waves are comprised from a contrastingly different fabric, namely
unobservable quantum probability amplitudes (Georgiev, 2020). Observable physical quantities during a
quantum measurement are the eigenvalues of some quantum operator (observable) Â, which is represented
by a matrix (Dirac, 1967; Fayngold & Fayngold, 2013; Susskind & Friedman, 2014; Hayashi et al., 2015).
The quantum observable Â may operate upon any quantum wavefunction and generate another quantum
wavefunction (Holevo, 2001). Of special physical interest is the set of eigenvectors of Â such that the action
of Â on an eigenvector |Φ〉 returns the same eigenvector |Φ〉 multiplied by a number λ referred to as an
eigenvalue, namely Â|Φ〉 = λ|Φ〉 (Strang, 2016). In n-dimensional Hilbert space, the quantum observable Â
will have n orthogonal eigenvectors |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉, . . . , |Φn〉, each of which will be associated with a corresponding
eigenvalue, λ1, λ2, . . . , λn. The eigenvectors and eigenvalues of quantum observables play a major role in the
process of quantum measurement as they are exhibited as measurement outcomes. Suppose that at time t
we measure a quantum system whose quantum state is







where Î is the identity operator and αn = 〈Φn|Ψ(t)〉 are complex coefficients (Georgiev, 2020). For the
quantum measurement of the observable Â, the outcome could only be one of the eigenvalues present in the
set {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn}, after which the quantum system will collapse into the eigenvector corresponding to the
obtained eigenvalue. For example, if the eigenvalue λn is obtained, immediately after the measurement at
time t′ the quantum system will turn into the state |Ψ(t′)〉 = |Φn〉. The probability to obtain the particular
eigenvalue λn is determined by the Born rule as the absolute square of the inner product between the initial
quantum state |Ψ(t)〉 and the final quantum state given by the corresponding eigenvector |Φn〉, namely
Prob(λn) = |〈Φn|Ψ(t)〉|2 (4)
In other words, the very act of quantum measurement is intrusive and forces the measured system to react.
This abrupt collapse |Ψ(t)〉 → |Φn〉 provides some insight into the origin of unobservability of the quantum
wavefunction |Ψ(t)〉, namely the measurement of a quantum observable Â transforms probabilistically the
measured system into an eigenvector |Φn〉 of the measured observable. As a result, the external observer
may learn the quantum state |Φn〉 after the measurement, but is unable to reconstruct with certainty what
the quantum state |Ψ(t)〉 of the measured system was before the measurement (Georgiev, 2017).
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As a highlight of our brief excursion into quantum foundations, we could say that quantum states are
vectors |Ψ〉 whereas quantum observables are operators Â in Hilbert space. This mathematical distinction
results in a schism between what physically exists and what can be physically observed. The failure of
naive realism, which identifies what is observed with what exists, allows quantum theory to accommodate
conscious experiences that are subjective, private and inaccessible to observation.
Thomas Nagel has been able to nicely illustrate in a thought experiment the inner privacy of conscious
experiences by examining the taste of chocolate (Nagel, 1987): suppose that an awake patient is undergoing
an open skull neurosurgery with local anesthesia while eating chocolate. The surgeon will be able to directly
see the soft, spongy substance of the patient’s brain, and if a microscope equipped with sophisticated patch-
clamp device is used, electrical recordings from individual neurons would reveal a chain of complicated
physicochemical processes. Nonetheless, the surgeon would find nowhere the taste of chocolate, because the
patient’s conscious experiences are unobservable. In fact, conscious experiences are inside the mind with a
kind of insideness that is quite unlike how the brain is inside the skull (Nagel, 1987).
In classical physics, the reductive approach to consciousness is unsuccessful because the unobservable
conscious mind cannot be identified with an observable physical subsystem of the brain. In quantum physics,
however, the conscious mind could be reductively identified with the quantum information integrated in some
quantum state of the brain |Ψ〉 because both are unobservable. In this case, the unobservable conscious mind
|Ψ〉 will not be a functional product of the observable brain Â that could be investigated with brain imaging
devices. Instead, the situation will be reversed—the observable brain Â will be the product (classical record)
of actualized mind decisions (choices) (Georgiev, 2017).
The temporal dynamics of quantum states governed by the Schrödinger equation has an important
implication for the dynamic timescale of conscious processes. The total energy of the quantum system is
given by the eigenvalues En and eigenstates |En〉 of the Hamiltonian operator Ĥ, namely Ĥ |En〉 = En |En〉.
For each eigenstate with definite energy, the Schrödinger equation generates solutions of the form
Ψn(t) |En〉 = Ψn(0)e−ı ωn t |En〉 (5)
The angular frequency ωn = En/~ of each solution Ψn(t) |En〉 establishes the quantum dynamic scale
(period) of the process tn = 2π/ωn with which the wavefunction Ψn(t) rotates inside the Hilbert space. For




where kB is the Boltzmann constant, and T is the temperature. At physiological temperature T = 310 K,
the dynamic timescale is faster than 0.15 picoseconds, which is in the realm of quantum chemistry. Thus, the
dynamic timescale of conscious processes is consistent with picosecond conformational transitions of neural
biomolecules (Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2007). Examples of picosecond protein dynamics, which is directly
related to the neuronal processing of information, include regulation of conductance of voltage-gated ion
channels (Callahan & Roux, 2018), activation of ionotropic glutamate receptors by neurotransmitter binding
(Kubo et al., 2004), or vibrational motions of the α-helix backbone involved in the conformational flexibility
of SNARE proteins that drive exocytosis of synaptic vesciles (Stelzer et al., 2008). In contrast, the observable
brain dynamics of electric spikes propagating along neuronal projections at a millisecond timescale describes
transfer of classical information, which is triggered by quantum processes, but sets no lower bound on how
fast these quantum processes are.
4. Physical properties and theoretical utility of quantum information
Quantum information theory has been able to distill the main properties of quantum information into
a number of no-go theorems (Nielsen & Chuang, 2010; Pathak, 2013; Hayashi et al., 2015). Unknown
quantum states that are not prepared by us cannot be read (cannot be unambiguously reconstructed from
measurements) (Busch, 1997), cannot be cloned (multiplied) (Wootters & Zurek, 1982), cannot be deleted
(Pati & Braunstein, 2000), cannot be broadcast (Barnum et al., 1996), and cannot be converted into a string
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of bits of classical information, even if an infinite string of classical bits were allowed (Pathak, 2013). Bell’s
theorem further shows that quantum entangled states of composite quantum systems exhibit nonlocality,
which can only be explained by the admission of superluminal action at a distance between the spatially
separated quantum components (Aspect, 1999; Georgescu, 2014; Rosenfeld et al., 2017). These physical
properties of quantum information are able to address different aspects of consciousness.
The unobservability of quantum information is able to protect the inner privacy of conscious experiences
against external peering with alleged mind-reading devices (Georgiev, 2017). This means that we may keep
secrets in our mind insofar we do not verbalize them in words. Because our inner monologue is expressible
as a string of classical bits of information, we should be aware that the neural electric signals corresponding
to individual words are subject to eavesdropping, even before the words are spoken in the form of audible
acoustic waves.
The nonclonability of quantum information is able to protect the identity of the self against possible
duplication at a different location in space (Georgiev, 2017). Being macroscopically localized ensures the
historicity of the self and underlies our perception of being embodied. Knowing that we cannot be clones
of another conscious being also provides us with an insurance against external blackmailing with alleged
torture of multiple brain-in-a-vat clones of ourselves, which are supposed to have conscious experiences
indistinguishable from ours (Elga, 2004). Classically, we may doubt whether we are the genuine original or
a clone, whereas in a quantum world, we may rest assured that we are physically unique.
The inconvertibility of quantum information into classical information is able to explain why we cannot
communicate the phenomenal qualia of our experiences (what it is like to feel what we experience) to others
(Georgiev, 2017). Suppose that in an imaginary world our conscious experiences were communicable. In such
a world, we would have been able to restore missing senses through transmission of classical strings of bits,
0s and 1s, which comprise the digital files of textual or audiovisual material. For example, we would have
been able to make a blind person see a visual scenery by simply describing it with our words (Georgiev, 2017,
2020). Effectively, blindness would have been cured through genuine visual experiences elicited by words.
Unfortunately, this is not our world. Nonetheless, existing regularities within our conscious experiences can
be communicated to other people. Conscious experiences can be categorized into distinct categories: familiar
or unfamiliar, pleasant or unpleasant, etc. Such categorization is expressible in classical bits of information.
In fact, classical information can be used for the preparation of a set of orthogonal (distinguishable) quantum
states. This may provide a possible explanation of why we do not continuously experience stored memories
but need a recall in order for certain memories to be consciously relived, namely our memories are nothing
but classical instructions of how to bring back the quantum brain in a certain quantum state selected from
an orthogonal set of states.
The inerasability of quantum information is able to protect against external hindering with one’s causal
potency or free will (Georgiev, 2017). Classical deletion works by taking different input classical states and
deterministically preparing them in a certain output state designated to be the empty state (Shen et al.,
2011). Different quantum states, however, produce probabilistic outcomes upon measurement, and there is
no general unitary operation that could transform all possible input quantum states into the same empty
quantum state. This means that the preparation of a desirable quantum state is always a post-selection,
namely, the quantum system chooses a measurement outcome in accordance with inherent propensities given
by the Born rule, and then the external observer chooses to work with only those quantum systems that
have produced a certain desirable outcome. It should also be noted, that future quantum choices are not
dependent on past quantum choices. For example, a single electron can be prepared multiple times in an
initial state |↑z〉 such that the electron spin points up along the z-axis, after which the electron spin can be
measured along the x-axis. For each of these measurements, there will be an equal probability for the spin
to point up |↑x〉 or down |↓x〉 along the x-axis, regardless of what the sequence of previous measurement
outcomes for the x component of spin is.
The nonlocality of quantum information due to quantum entanglement is able to explain the combination
problem (binding problem) of conscious experiences (Georgiev, 2017). Indeed, while the reductive solution to
the mind–brain problem avoids the charge of epiphenomenal emergence by attributing elementary conscious
experiences to all matter, it requires a mechanism by which elementary conscious experiences could combine
together and unite into larger, more complex, and ultimately human-like conscious minds (Basile, 2010;
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Coleman, 2012; Morris, 2017). Quantum entanglement provides the physical mechanism by which the
quantum probability amplitudes of component quantum systems become inseparable (Horodecki et al., 2009;
Peled et al., 2020; Gudder, 2020). As an example, consider the singlet state composed of two entangled




(|↑〉A |↓〉B − |↓〉A |↑〉B) (7)
where neither the particle A, nor the particle B has its own separable state vector. However, if the composite
state of particles A and B can be expressed as a tensor product state
|Ψ〉AB = |Ψ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉B (8)
then both particles A and B will have their own individual state vectors such that
|Ψ〉A = a1 |↑〉A + a2 |↓〉A (9)
|Ψ〉B = b1 |↑〉B + b2 |↓〉B (10)





In the tensor product state |Ψ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉B , it is not only that the particles A and B have their own state
vectors |Ψ〉A and |Ψ〉B , but the composite system also has a state vector |Ψ〉AB .
If the quantum information contained in the state vector is to be identified with the mind of the system,
to avoid paradoxical existence of minds within other minds it has to be specified that only state vectors that
cannot be expressed as tensor products correspond to individual minds. If a state vector can be expressed
as a tensor product, then it will correspond to a collection of separate minds. Thus, by decomposing the
quantum state |Ψ〉U of the universe into a tensor product form
|Ψ〉U = |Ψ〉1 ⊗ |Ψ〉2 ⊗ . . .⊗ |Ψ〉k (11)
quantum information theory provides a theoretical rule that explicitly specifies the boundaries of individual
minds |Ψ〉k in a universal complex-valued Hilbert space (Georgiev, 2017). The combination of conscious
experiences through quantum entanglement also elaborates on the free will theorem by Conway and Specker
(Conway & Kochen, 2006, 2009) by showing that elementary quantum particles possess free will that allows
them to produce contextual outcomes upon different quantum measurements but only as long as they are
in a separable tensor product state (Georgiev, 2017). Otherwise, if the elementary quantum particles enter
into a composite entangled state, it is the composite system that manifests free will, not the individual
components whose measurement outcomes have to be nonlocally correlated. In order to avoid quantum
entanglement of the whole universe into a single universal cosmic mind, the reductive quantum information
theoretic approach to consciousness requires the existence of a non-unitary physical process of objective
reduction with associated disentanglement of mascroscopic quantum physical systems that have attained a
certain energy threshold [for details see Chapter 6 in Georgiev (2017)].
The reductive identification of the quantum information contained in the quantum probability ampli-
tudes Ψ with consciousness leads to quantum panpsychism. This means that mentality in the form of
primitive subjective conscious experiences is attributed to all matter in the quantum universe. In other
words, consciousness does not emerge at some later stage in the history of the universe, but is already
present in the quantum probability amplitudes Ψ of all quantum particles at the very origin of the universe.
Here, it is important to emphasize that there is no single cosmic conscious mind permeating the universe,
but a stochastic collection of fleeting minds popping in and out of existence. Consider as an example, liquid
water near thermodynamic equilibrium. Thermal noise leads to vibrational motion of water molecules, but
does not prevent the formation of water clusters such as hexamer prisms or cages (H2O)6 through hydrogen
bonding (Foley & Mazziotti, 2013; Richardson et al., 2016). The hydrogen bonds share quantum entangle-
ment (Pusuluk et al., 2018) between water molecules, which would then imply the existence of fleeting minds
for each entangled cluster |Ψk〉 present in Eq. (11). These brief moments of subjectivity in the individual en-
tangled water clusters would last only for a few picoseconds (Elgabarty et al., 2020) before the water clusters
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are destroyed by the thermal noise. Because such fleeting minds in nonliving matter possess no memory and
no means for communication with the surrounding world, they lack many of the features that we attribute
to human consciousness. In the presence of interfaces provided by lipid membranes or protein biomolecules,
however, water molecules can form extended hydrogen bond networks (Paciaroni et al., 2008; Fayer, 2012;
Stöhr & Tkatchenko, 2019) whose interfacial orientational relaxation timescale of 18 ps is almost an order
of magnitude larger compared with the relaxation time of 2.6 ps in bulk water (Fayer, 2012). This already
illustrates how the presence of biomolecules supplies a form of ultrafast memory for thin layers of interfacial
water. To build a fully functional mental unit for the human mind, natural selection had to assemble elec-
trically excitable neurons from phospholipid membranes, proteins, signaling biomolecules, interfacial water
and electrolytes, which collectively not only support complex entangled quantum states, but could also store
long-term memories of those quantum states and use past memories to react to environmental stimuli.
5. Molecular mechanisms of human consciousness
The proposed quantum information-theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem is reductive in nature
and identifies quantum information contained in quantum probability amplitudes with experiences. This
endorses a form of quantum panpsychism or panexperientialism, namely all quantum particles posses some
elementary experiences that need to be organized through natural evolutionary processes in the proper way
to compose a human mind that has a sense of “self” and is capable of rational thinking. In humans, the
brain cortex is the seat of consciousness and normally there is only one dominant personality, which we
experiences as our conscious “I”. In certain abnormal cases, however, a single brain can contain several
minds, which may or may not be aware of each other’s existence (Georgiev, 2017). For example, in split-
brain patients who had their corpus callosum surgically severed in order to treat refractory epilepsy, each
of the two cortical hemispheres hosts a separate mind that could communicate individually and control a
half of the body apparently unaware of the other mind in the opposite hemisphere (Gazzaniga et al., 1962;
Sperry, 1966; Gazzaniga & Sperry, 1967; Sperry, 1982; Gazzaniga, 2002; Wolman, 2012). In psychiatric
disease, such as dissociative identity disorder (also known as multiple personality disorder) a single brain
may contain a number of different minds that take control over the body in succession (Gillig, 2009). The
possible existence of multiple minds inside a single brain is hard to explain classically, but it is a natural
prediction of quantum panpsychism. In normal conditions, a healthy dominant conscious “I” residing in
the brain cortex will not be aware of the existence of conscious experiences in other subcortical areas of
the brain. Thus, from the viewpoint of the conscious “I”, what is going on in the subcortical areas could
be called “subconsciousness”, but qualitatively these will be experiences to which the conscious “I” has
no concurrent access. In the rest of this section, we will focus on molecular mechanisms whose quantum
dynamics in the brain cortex may be characteristic for the realization of human consciousness expressed
through the conscious “I”.
The main thrust of quantum information theory is to conceptualize the differences between classical
and quantum physical behavior and distill those differences into explicit no-go theorems (Pathak, 2013;
Nielsen & Chuang, 2010). The application of quantum information-theoretic results to brain physiology,
however, requires underlying biomolecular substrates that exhibit quantum behavior. Recent advances in
the methods for solving numerically the Schrödinger equation allow ab initio studies of quantum physical
systems composed of several thousand atoms (Sholl & Steckel, 2009; Ullrich, 2012; Helgaker et al., 2013; Su
& Xu, 2017). So far, computational quantum chemistry has provided evidence for dynamic quantum effects
in biomolecule-ion interaction (Kolev et al., 2013, 2018), enzyme catalysis (Ishida et al., 2006; Ranaghan &
Mulholland, 2017; Sousa et al., 2016), ion channel gating (Bucher et al., 2010; Bucher & Rothlisberger, 2010;
Kariev et al., 2007; Kariev & Green, 2009, 2012; Kariev et al., 2014; Kariev & Green, 2019; Roy & Llinás,
2009; Maffeo et al., 2012; Flood et al., 2019), and protein-induced remodeling of phospholipid membranes
(Ingólfsson et al., 2016). Quantum tunneling in the gating of voltage-gated ion channels (Chancey et al.,
1992; Vaziri & Plenio, 2010; Kariev & Green, 2019) or zipping of SNARE (soluble N-ethylmaleimide-sensitive
factor attachment protein receptor) proteins in neurotransmitter release (Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2018) may
act as a quantum trigger whose effects are amplified into macroscopic patterns of electric activity of the
cortical neural network.
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Quantum effects inside the pores of ion channels confer selectivity for passage of a certain type of
ion (Bucher et al., 2010; Bucher & Rothlisberger, 2010; Kariev et al., 2007; Kariev & Green, 2009, 2012;
Kariev et al., 2014; Kariev & Green, 2019). Ion selectivity divides channels into excitatory or inhibitory.
Sodium and calcium channels excite the neuron because they let positively charged Na+ and Ca2+ ions,
respectively, enter into the cytosol. Conversely, potassium channels inhibit the neuron, as they let positively
charged K+ ions escape from the cytosol toward the extracellular space. At places where positively charged
ions enter the neuron, the electric voltage across the membrane increases and the membrane depolarizes.
Alternatively, if positively charged ions leave the neuron, the electric voltage decreases and the membrane
hyperpolarizes. Both depolarizations and hyperpolarizations spread along the neuronal projections and
summate at the axonal hillock where electric spikes are generated. The quantum behavior of individual
voltage-gated ion channels is manifested in the binary dynamic change of their electric conductance: the
open channel selectively conducts ions with a characteristic picosiemens single channel conductance, whereas
the closed channel does not conduct at all. At a given value of the transmembrane voltage of the neuron,
individual voltage-gated ion channels undergo stochastic (probabilistic) transitions between closed and open
states (Sakmann & Neher, 1995). When the voltage across the neuronal plasma membrane is far away from
the threshold for generation of an electric spike, the neuronal activity is not particularly sensitive to the
tiny stochastic fluctuations in the transmembrane potential due to single channel transitions between closed
and open conformations (Georgiev, 2015). When the voltage is near to the threshold value of −55 mV,
however, closing or opening of a single ion channel may influence the generation of electric spike (Destexhe
& Contreras, 2006). In the human brain cortex, there are ≈ 1.6× 1010 neurons (Azevedo et al., 2009) which
could attain firing frequencies of ≈ 40 Hz. Thus, each millisecond thousands of cortical neurons may sense
the closing or opening of a single channel and amplify its quantum dynamics into a macroscopically distinct
electric firing pattern of the cortical neuronal network.
Sensory and somatomotor information encoded in electric spikes is reliably transmitted across the
synapses of the sensory pathways from the sensory organs toward the brain cortex (Kim et al., 2013;
Singer, 2007; Glowatzki & Fuchs, 2002; Magistretti et al., 2015) or the somatomotor pathways from the
motor cortex toward the muscles (Kuno et al., 1971). To achieve reliability of transmission, the chemical
synapses in these pathways release multiple synaptic vesicles upon depolarization of the presynaptic axonal
boutons (Rudolph et al., 2015). The multivesicular release of neurotransmitter molecules then generates
large postsynaptic currents in the target neuron (Rudolph et al., 2015). The reliable transmission of electric
signals between the brain cortex and the body (Fig. 3) ensures the survival of the organism through the
execution of fight-or-flight responses.
In contrast to extracortical synapses, individual synapses inside the brain cortex and the hippocampus
were found to release either a single synaptic vesicle or none. Thus, each cortical synapse (Fig. 4) appears
to possess only one functional release site at a given time (Stevens & Wang, 1995). The probability for
release of neurotransmitter through synaptic vesicle exocytosis at intracortical synapses is 0.35 ± 0.23 per
axonal spike (Dobrunz & Stevens, 1997). This means that an electrically excited axonal bouton is twice
more likely to fail than succeed in releasing neurotransmitter. If it is conservatively estimated that each
cortical neuron has only n = 1000 axonal boutons, and on average only k = 350 of these boutons release
neurotransmitter per electric spike, the number of possible combinations given by the binomial coefficient
n!
k!(n−k)! for exocytosis per neuron is over 10
279. If the mind were not in control of synaptic vesicle release,
the cortical neural network would have been disorganized within seconds (Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2018).
Fortunately, recent advances in molecular neuroscience have revealed an elaborate protein machinery that
regulates synaptic vesicle fusion with the active patch of presynaptic plasma membrane (Branco & Staras,
2009; Südhof, 2013).
The minimal molecular machinery capable of driving synaptic vesicle fusion is comprised of only three
SNARE proteins: synaptobrevin, syntaxin and SNAP-25 (Fig. 5) (Weber et al., 1998). These three SNARE
proteins zip together to form a bundle of four α-helices referred to as the core SNARE complex. The
twisting of the 4-α-helix bundle inside the core SNARE complex applies a traction force that drives the
fusion of the opposing phospholipid bilayers of the synaptic vesicle and the plasma membrane (Weber et al.,
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Figure 3: Classical communication through electric signals between the brain cortex and the body. The somatosensory pathway
(left) delivers sensory information from the body to the somatosensory cortex in the postcentral gyrus, whereas the somatomotor
pathway (right) delivers motor information from the motor cortex in the precentral gyrus to the body muscles. The spinal cord
segments, medulla and pons are represented with their transversal sections, whereas thalamus and cortex are shown in frontal
slice. Modified from Georgiev (2017).
SNARE complex is potent enough to drive synaptic vesicle exocytosis even in neurons expressing artificially
engineered lipid-anchored synaptobrevin and syntaxin molecules that lack their transmembrane regions
(Zhou et al., 2013).
In different neuron types, the process of exocytosis is regulated by different sets of SNARE master
proteins (Zhou et al., 2015; Rizo & Südhof, 2012; Südhof & Rothman, 2009; Giraudo et al., 2006) that
effectively set the potential energy barrier for vesicle fusion. The potential energy V (r) enters into the
Hamiltonian
Ĥ = − ~
2
2m
∇2 + V (r) (12)
for the Schrödinger equation, where it constrains the motion of massive quantum particles with mass m.
The motion of quantum particles is free inside spatial regions with zero potential energy, analogously to the
classical case. However, there is a substantial difference between classical and quantum behavior for regions
in which the potential energy is non-zero. Classical particles are forbidden from entering spatial regions where
the particle energy is less than the potential energy, E0 < V (r), whereas quantum particles are not (Landau
& Lifshitz, 1965). In fact, the quantum wavefunction Ψ(r) needs to be continuous throughout space, which
allows the quantum particle to tunnel through the potential energy barrier with height V0 > E0 and appear
on the other side. In protein α-helices, quantum quasi-particles called Davydov solitons, which are composed
of amide I excitation self-trapped in the lattice distortion of hydrogen bonded peptide groups, are able to
transport energy along the protein and could trigger conformational transitions (Georgiev & Glazebrook,















Figure 4: Excitatory synaptic contact between pyramidal cortical neurons. The presynaptic axonal bouton has a pool of
synaptic vesicles that contain neurotransmitter (glutamate). During an electric spike, the activation of presynaptic voltage-
gated calcium channels initiates Ca2+ influx at the active zone, which may trigger fusion of a single synaptic vesicle with the
plasma membrane. The released neurotransmitter (glutamate) acts on postsynaptic ligand-gated ion channels, such as AMPA
(α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid) or NMDA (N -methyl-D-aspartate) receptors, to induce postsynaptic
electric currents in the target neuron. Structural support for the synapse is provided by adhesive bridges and scaffold proteins,
whereas mitochondria ensure robust energy supply for synaptic neurotransmission. Modified from Georgiev (2017).
mechanical description of the process involves quantum tunneling through potential barrier whose height is
higher than the energy of quantum quasi-particle, presumably Davydov soliton, which triggers the release
(Beck & Eccles, 1992; Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2012, 2019b).
The mass of the Davydov soliton is ≈ 5% of the proton mass and readily undergoes quantum tunneling
(Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2020a). The Davydov soliton is a type of acoustic polaron formed by the interaction
of excitons (C=O bond vibrations) with phonons (deformations of the hydrogen bonded lattice of peptide
groups) inside protein α-helices. Because the protein backbone is quite massive (the average mass on an
amino acid residue is 114 proton masses), the quantum motion of peptide groups (given by the generalized
Ehrenfest theorem) is virtually indistinguishable from classical motion. Consequently, the protein backbone
could be viewed as providing a potential energy landscape for the motion of the much lighter excitons.
Through nonlinear feedback effect called self-trapping, the presence of the exciton, in turn, influences the
motion of the hydrogen bonded peptide groups inducing phonon dressing. The combination of an exciton
together with its phonon dressing is referred to as Davydov soliton. When a portion of the protein α-helix is
embedded inside a phospholipid membrane or interacts with another protein, there is a resulting clamping










Figure 5: Synaptic vesicle exocytosis driven by cooperative zipping of SNARE protein complexes. Initial docking of the synaptic
vesicles at the active zone of the synapse is actuated by partially zipped SNARE protein complexes (left). Electric activity of
the presynaptic terminal with its accompanying Ca2+ influx triggers full zipping of the SNARE complexes in a docked vesicle
with subsequent opening of the fusion pore and extrusion of neurotransmitter from the synaptic vesicle into the synaptic cleft
(right). Modified from Georgiev & Glazebrook (2014).
of external clamps is that an exciton/soliton propagating along the α-helix would meet a massive barrier.
Depending on the mass of the barrier, the exciton may be able to pass through the barrier employing
quantum tunneling or may reflect from the barrier (Fig. 6). In the case of SNARE zipping, the role of
the barrier is played by the Ca2+ sensor synaptotagmin, which clamps the SNARE complex in partially
zipped conformation. Quantum tunneling of Davydov soliton through the barrier may induce full zipping of
the SNARE complex and trigger exocytosis. In essence, massive proteins do not quantum tunnel, whereas
quantum excitations propagating along the proteins do. Quantum tunneling of such excitations could act as
a trigger that steers the overall protein motion at points of bifurcation into one of two alternative classical
paths. Thus, cortical neurons that have surpassed with certainty the voltage threshold for the generation of
electric spike, are able to amplify the quantum dynamics of SNARE proteins at individual axonal buttons
into a macroscopic pattern of active synapses that release neurotransmitter molecules.
In summary, the dominant conscious “I” in the brain cortex is to be identified with the unobservable
quantum information contained in the quantum state of quantum entangled membrane-bound proteins,
including voltage-gated ion channels, ligand-gated ion channels and SNARE proteins, residing in the plasma
membranes of millions of cortical neurons. The dynamic timescale of the underlying quantum processes is
on the order of picoseconds, which addresses effectively previously noted issues with decoherence (Tegmark,
2000). The power of the thermal noise is both frequency and temperature dependent as given by the









where h is the Planck constant, f is the frequency, ∆f = f2 − f1 is the bandwidth, kB is the Boltzmann


















































































Figure 6: Quantum dynamics of Davydov soliton visualized by the probability |an|2 of finding the exciton at the peptide
group n inside a hydrogen bonded protein α-helix spine simulated for 100 ps. In the absence of massive barrier (M = 1),
the evelope of excition probabilities |an|2 propagates as a solitary wave (soliton), which reflects from the ends of the protein
α-helix. In the presence of massive barrier (M = 160) extending over 3 peptide groups n = 22−25, each of which with effective
mass 160 times greater than the mass of an average amino acid residue, the soliton tunnels through the barrier with picosecond
time delay. When the barrier mass is increased by only 6.25% to M = 170, the tunneling is drastically suppressed due to
exponential decay of excition quantum probability amplitudes inside the barrier and the soliton cannot penetrate to the other
side. For barrier with M = 300, the soliton bounces off the barrier resembling the elastic collision of a classical billiard ball
with a wall. Red arrows help indicate the direction of motion.
near absolute zero but also for very high frequencies over 1 THz. Psychophysical and clinical evidence from
patients with time agnosia, which supports a submillisecond timescale of consciousness, has been extensively
discussed in previous works (Georgiev, 2013, 2017).
To highlight the novel features of the quantum information theoretic approach to the mind–brain problem,
it would be helpful to compare it with the orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR) theory (Hameroff &
Penrose, 2014) that also attempts to connect quantum mechanics to consciousness. Because the points of
disagreement are substantial and somewhat involved, we will discuss each conceptual difference separately.
First, the two theories use the word “quantum” in mutually exclusive senses. In quantum information
theory, the “quantum” characteristics of physical systems (wave-particle duality, superposition, interference,
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entanglement, tunneling) originate from compliance with continuous unitary dynamics according to the
Schrödinger equation, whose solution is the quantum wavefunction Ψ. In the Orch OR theory, the main
focus is on discrete non-unitary, non-computable violations of the Schrödinger equation induced by “quantum
gravity”. Thus, the two theories disagree on whether conscious experiences are present during the continuous
period of unitary dynamics according to the Schrödinger equation: the quantum information theory says
yes, the Orch OR theory says no. Also, consciousness in the quantum information theory originates in the
unitary dynamics, whereas consciousness in the Orch OR theory originates in the non-unitary dynamics.
Second, the two theories assess the need of “emergence” with contrasting evaluations. In quantum
information theory, the quantum wavefunction Ψ is reductively identified with the mind of the physical
system. Therefore, conscious experiences originate as physical solutions Ψ of the Schrödinger equation
and need no further physical laws to miraculously pop into existence emergent sentience from insentient
matter. In the Orch OR theory, conscious experiences emerge in the form of discrete subjective “flashes”,
“bings”, or “nows” from non-unitary, non-computable objective reduction events in the fundamental space-
time geometry. The main problem with “emergence” is that it only postulates violation of the physical
laws, but does not inform us about the properties of the emergent phenomenon. In contrast, the reductive
identification of consciousness with Ψ implies that consciousness should necessarily possess all the physical
characteristics that can be deduced from the Schrödinger equation.
Third, the two theories attribute distinct “causal efficacy” to consciousness. In quantum information
theory, the absolute square of the quantum wavefunction |Ψ|2 determines the probabilities for future courses
of action. Therefore, if consciousness is Ψ, then it causally introduces biases in what future physical events
can happen and how probable they are. Reduction of the wavefunction Ψ ≡
∑
i Ψi to a particular outcome Ψi
upon quantum measurement, is then viewed as an act of choice making and manifestation of inherent free
will by the quantum system, which already possesses consciousness. In the Orch OR theory, conscious
experiences are generated by the non-computable objective reduction process,
∑
i Ψi → Ψi, yet due to the
physical closure of the world, the emergent consciousness becomes an epiphenomenon that only witnesses
what has happened, but is causally ineffective to determine what can happen or will happen next. Natural
selection and evolution of epiphenomenal consciousness is impossible.
Fourth, the two theories operate at different timescales and rely on different underlying biomolecular
substrates. In quantum information theory, human consciousness operates at picosecond timescale and
is supported by voltage-gated ion channels and other membrane-bound proteins incorporated in excitable
neuronal membranes, which is consistent with the neural delivery of sensory information and output of
motor information in the form of electric spikes. In the Orch OR theory, human consciousness operates at
millisecond timescale and is supported by cytoskeletal microtubules, which are hypothesized to be isolated
from the surrounding neural electric activities to prevent quantum decoherence, yet also somehow capable to
control the generation of electric spikes at the axonal hillock. Fortunately, the discovery of general anesthetics
provides an experimental framework for studying the molecular mechanisms of human consciousness through
attempts to reversibly turn it off and on in clinical settings with human subjects.
6. The SNARE protein complex is main molecular target for volatile anesthetics
Pharmacological studies have shown that volatile anesthetics activate ligand-gated GABAA chloride ion
channels (Garcia et al., 2010), and block voltage-gated sodium (Purtell et al., 2015) or calcium (Jokso-
vic et al., 2009) ion channels. The increased sensitivity to volatile anesthetics conferred by the expression
of mutant voltage-gated sodium channels (Pal et al., 2015), however, provides only indirect link to con-
sciousness, and experimental attempts to introduce resistance to anesthesia in mice expressing artificially
engineered mutant voltage-gated calcium channels (Petrenko et al., 2007) or volatile anesthetic-resistant
GABAA chloride ion channels (Werner et al., 2011) have been unsuccessful. In contrast, several lines of
experimental evidence point to direct involvement of SNARE proteins in volatile anesthetic-induced un-
consciousness (Georgiev & Glazebrook, 2010). Firstly, general anesthesia with clinical concentrations of
volatile anesthetics, such as isoflurane or halothane, inhibits excitatory neurotransmitter release (MacIver
et al., 1996; Herring et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2004), and selectively erases consciousness, but not all cortical
electric responses. In particular, electric potentials evoked by applied visual stimuli are routinely recorded
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from the visual cortex of anesthetized animals (Lamme et al., 1998; Imas et al., 2005; Sellers et al., 2015).
Secondly, volatile anesthetics bind with high affinity to syntaxin either as a purified protein or as a com-
ponent of the core SNARE complex (Nagele et al., 2005; Johansson et al., 2000). Thirdly, resistance to
volatile anesthetics is conferred by a genetic mutation that results in the translation of a truncated form of
syntaxin (van Swinderen et al., 1999). Animals with truncated syntaxin require higher doses of isoflurane for
induction of anesthesia and also recover faster from anesthesia in comparison with wild-type animals (Troup
et al., 2019). In vitro experiments further show that the expression of the truncated syntaxin in PC12 cells
completely blocks the effects of isoflurane on the neurotransmitter release machinery despite the presence
of endogenous syntaxin (Herring et al., 2009). Taken together, these findings support the aforementioned
quantum model of neurotransmitter release in which volatile anesthetics inhibit quantum tunneling by rais-
ing the height of the potential energy barrier for SNARE protein zipping. Hence, the quantum quasiparticles
(Davydov solitons) required for exocytosis are effectively isolated from their environment by being trapped
in deep potential wells and their quantum states remain separable from the rest of the brain. According
to the quantum information-theoretic approach to consciousness, it is quantum entanglement (as opposed
to quantum separability) of component systems that binds conscious experiences together (Georgiev, 2017).
Therefore, anesthesia works not by turning conscious experiences on or off, but rather by interfering with the
combination of elementary conscious experiences into a unitary composite conscious experience. In essence,
by changing the potential energy barrier landscape in the brain, volatile anesthetics temporarily split the
conscious mind into myriad pieces, analogously to how physical severing of the two brain hemispheres gen-
erates two separate minds in split-brain patients (Wolman, 2012). The only difference is that the anesthetic
action is reversible, whereas the physical severing of the brain is not.
7. Holevo’s bound on accessible classical information from quantum measurements
The phenomenal nature of conscious experiences is incommunicable as established by Locke’s inverted
qualia thought experiment [for a detailed discussion see Georgiev (2017, 2020)]. This means that our
introspective access to our own feelings and conscious experiences is fundamentally different from a scientific
“observation” whose outcomes can be communicated to others in the form of classical bits of information. In
fact, a consistency argument based on indistinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states also establishes
that conscious experiences cannot have the status of observations: if in reductive quantum theories of mind
non-orthogonal quantum states comprise different conscious experiences, then we should not be able to
report what exactly it is to be in one of the states instead of the other, or which of two non-orthogonal
states we have been in, otherwise external observers would have been able to use our reports to distinguish
non-orthogonal quantum brain states, i.e. a well-known no-go theorem by Busch (Busch, 1997) would have
been violated.
The incommunicability of consciousness has troubled philosophers for centuries. Whereas we cannot
express what the phenomenal nature of qualia is (Nagel, 1974, 1987; Chalmers, 1995), Wittgenstein has
argued that we can express some of our feelings in words such as “pain,” “anger,” or “love,” which we all
understand (Wittgenstein, 2009; Tang, 2014; Baker, 1998). Quantum physics provides a valuable insight
into why we can say something meaningful about our consciousness, but not all there is about it. As
we have already elaborated in some detail, the quantum information comprising the quantum state of a
quantum physical system is unobservable and cannot be fully converted into classical information. However,
Alexander Holevo has been able to show that each quantum system can carry a certain amount of accessible










where {ρ̂1, ρ̂2, . . . , ρ̂k} is a set of quantum states (described by their density matrix operators, cf. (Be-
linfante, 1980; Hughston et al., 1993; de Gosson, 2018)) that are drawn from the probability distribution
{p1, p2, . . . , pk}, and S (ρ̂) is the von Neumann entropy (von Neumann, 1955; Ohya & Volovich, 2011) of the
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density matrix ρ̂ measured in bits
S (ρ̂) = −
∑
j
λj log2 λj (15)
with λj denoting the eigenvalues of the density matrix operator ρ̂. Noteworthy, the von Neumann entropy is
a concave functional on the space of density matrices, S (ρ̂) ≥ 0. Holevo’s accessible information is maximal
when: (i) the quantum states ρ̂k are pure, that is ρ̂k = |ψk〉〈ψk|, since they have zero von Neumann entropy




pkS (ρ̂k) = 0 (16)
(ii) the quantum states ρ̂k are orthogonal, 〈ψk|ψk′〉 = 0 for k 6= k′ and 〈ψk|ψk′〉 = 1 for k = k′, and (iii)
the probabilities pk in the probability distribution are equal. A composite quantum system consisting of
n qubits evolves in a Hilbert space with 2n dimensions. This provides 2n orthogonal quantum basis states
ρ̂k available for encoding of classical information. If those 2
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Combining Eqs. (16) and (18) together implies that for a quantum system of n qubits the maximal value
of Holevo’s bound is χ = n bits. In other words, a composite quantum system that contains n qubits can
carry up to n bits of accessible classical information, which can be extracted through measurement by an
external observer (Holevo, 1973, 1998).
Quantum physics allows orthogonal quantum states to be distinguished even though the same cannot
be done unambiguously for non-orthogonal quantum states. Therefore, we may be able to communicate
something meaningful in the form of words (bits of classical information) about those of our conscious expe-
riences that correspond to orthogonal quantum brain states (Georgiev, 2020). If consciousness is comprised
of quantum information, it will not be completely inaccessible for others, but rather it will have an accessible
part which does not exceed the classical bits of information allowed by Holevo’s theorem.
Returning back to Wittgenstein’s example, we are able to conclude that we do not really communicate
the phenomenal qualia of “pain,” “anger,” or “love,” but rather describe distinguishable classical situations
under which we expect other humans to consciously experience feelings that are qualitatively similar to
ours. For example, one way to explain what the “pain” is could be to note that it is the subjective
feeling that we experience when we hit our finger with a hammer. Such an explanation will work for all
people who are capable of experiencing pain, but will fail for people with syringomyelia who are unable
to feel pain in their extremities due to a cyst that damages their spinal cord (Klekamp & Samii, 2002).
Thus, consciousness is not directly observable or directly accessible. We are able to say some meaningful
facts about our conscious experiences, but not everything there is about these experiences (Georgiev, 2017,
2020). Holevo’s theorem links the orthogonality of quantum states in Hilbert space with the possibility
of a partially accessible consciousness by others. Conscious experiences can be private in regard to their
phenomenal content (qualia) insofar we can communicate as a string of bits of classical information only the
distinguishable physical circumstances for their occurrence. The latter is sufficient to differentiate between
conscious experiences with perceptibly distinct phenomenal content and allows us to label these experiences
with words such as “pain,” “anger,” or “love.”
Introspectively, we do not perceive ourselves as being built of atoms, molecules or neurons. When we
decide to close our eyes or to move one of our limbs, we do not have any idea which neuron in our brain is
firing to deliver the appropriate electric signal to our muscles. Yet, if we undergo open skull neurosurgery,
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our brain can be observed and its electric activity recorded. Thus, the brain may appear to be what the
conscious mind looks like from a third-person, objective perspective. But according to quantum information
theory this cannot be exactly right. If consciousness comprises the quantum information in the existing
quantum brain state, then it cannot be observed. Instead, upon measurement of some quantum observable
of the brain, the quantum state has to choose a possible quantum outcome among the possible eigenvalues
of the observable. Thus, the observable brain is the classical record of observable eigenvalues of past mind
choices (decisions). The irreversibility of mind choices ensures that the observable brain is an objective
construct for all possible observers. Because the anatomical brain is accessible classical information, it can
be observed, shared, communicated, copied and analyzed by multiple observers. The observability of the
brain supports objectivity in neuroscience as it grants multiple scientists with simultaneous access to multiple
identical copies of classical information about the same brain, which can then be analyzed independently.
8. Concluding remarks
Our conscious minds exist in the physical universe where they appear to be causally potent agents ca-
pable of controlling our behavior and transforming the surrounding world (Yablo, 1992; Crane & Brewer,
1995; Jackson, 1996). Therefore, if we are to have a scientific theory of consciousness, conscious experiences
should be represented in physical equations and need to be governed by physical laws (Georgiev, 2013,
2017). In a classical world, all physical quantities are observable and communicable. This severely restrains
the scope of classical physical theories because an unobservable and incommunicable consciousness cannot
be reduced to anything already present in the physical equations. Instead consciousness needs to somehow
emerge as a functional product of the observable brain, which will unfortunately turn the emergent con-
sciousness into a useless, causally ineffective epiphenomenon overrun by the deterministic laws of classical
physics (Georgiev, 2019). In a quantum universe comprised of unobservable and incommunicable quantum
information, however, epiphenomenal consciousness is avoidable thanks to quantum indeterminism, and the
perplexing inner privacy of consciousness could be seen to originate in the physical properties of quantum
information integrated in brain cortical quantum states (Georgiev, 2017, 2020; Melkikh & Khrennikov, 2015;
Melkikh, 2019).
In the quantum reductive approach to consciousness, conscious experiences are identified with quantum
brain states, which are in some relevant sense private or noncommunicable. When we introspect our quantum
conscious states, we are able to report only a certain amount of classical information that does not exceed
Holevo’s bound. The incommunicable qualia of conscious experiences, which are privately accessed through
introspection, then correspond to quantum information that cannot be converted into classical information.
This incommunicable quantum information is inaccessible to external observers. Thus, introspection is not
equivalent to quantum measurement. We continuously experience the contents of our conscious minds, which
means that the introspective access to our inner mental world, provided through identity relation between
consciousness and quantum information contained in the quantum brain state Ψ, is continuous and not
discrete. The unitary quantum evolution of the quantum brain state Ψ, which among other things also leads
to entanglement of different brain subcomponents, describes changes in unobservable conscious experiences
and their binding or composition. The quantum measurements of the brain are discrete events performed
by effector organs such as muscles or glands, which react to neuronal electric impulses outputted by efferent
axon terminals. The glial cells, which nourish the neurons, also perform quantum measurements upon
brain neurons for the purposes of maintaining proper homeostasis of brain electrolytes or other chemicals.
The measurement of quantum brain observables by glial cells, effector organs or physical devices leads to
decoherence of the quantum brain state Ψ and extracts accessible classical bits of information from which is
constructed the “observable brain.” Thus, quantum information theory addresses the mind–brain problem
by utilizing the dichotomy between quantum state vectors and quantum observables.
The quantum physical laws, expressed in the Schrödinger equation and the Born rule, introduce a
paradigm shift in consciousness research by making all physical statements about the mind or the brain
subject to mathematical precision. General statements valid for all physically admissible Hamiltonians,
which govern the dynamics of the quantum system, are subject to quantum no-go theorems. This can resolve
philosophical problems only by considering the physical properties of quantum information without the
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need of explicitly solving any equations. Specific statements valid for a concrete biomolecular Hamiltonian,
however, require quantum chemical methods for solving numerically the many-body Schrödinger equation.
Currently available supercomputers allow the derivation and experimental testing of quantum predictions
for physical systems consisting of several thousand atoms. Future developments of faster supercomputers
and better techniques for numerically solving the Schrödinger equation will enable even tighter integration
of quantum physics in consciousness research.
Conflict of interest
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
References
Aspect, A. (1999). Bell’s inequality test: more ideal than ever. Nature, 398 , 189–190. doi:10.1038/18296.
Azevedo, F. A. C., Carvalho, L. R. B., Grinberg, L. T., Farfel, J. M., Ferretti, R. E. L., Leite, R. E. P., Filho, W. J., Lent, R.,
& Herculano-Houzel, S. (2009). Equal numbers of neuronal and nonneuronal cells make the human brain an isometrically
scaled-up primate brain. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 513 , 532–541. doi:10.1002/cne.21974.
Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience. Progress
in Brain Research, 150 , 45–53. doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9.
Baker, G. (1998). The private language argument. Language and Communication, 18 , 325–356. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(98)
00010-X.
Barnum, H., Caves, C. M., Fuchs, C. A., Jozsa, R., & Schumacher, B. (1996). Noncommuting mixed states cannot be broadcast.
Physical Review Letters, 76 , 2818–2821. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.76.2818.
Basile, P. (2010). It must be true – but how can it be? Some remarks on panpsychism and mental composition. Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplement , 67 , 93–112. doi:10.1017/S1358246110000044.
Beck, F., & Eccles, J. C. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 89 , 11357–11361. doi:10.1073/pnas.89.23.11357.
Belinfante, F. J. (1980). Density matrix formulation of quantum theory and its physical interpretation. International Journal
of Quantum Chemistry, 17 , 1–24. doi:10.1002/qua.560170102.
Bosking, W. H., Beauchamp, M. S., & Yoshor, D. (2017a). Electrical stimulation of visual cortex: relevance for the development
of visual cortical prosthetics. Annual Review of Vision Science, 3 , 141–166. doi:10.1146/annurev-vision-111815-114525.
Bosking, W. H., Sun, P., Ozker, M., Pei, X., Foster, B. L., Beauchamp, M. S., & Yoshor, D. (2017b). Saturation in phosphene
size with increasing current levels delivered to human visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 37 , 7188–7197. doi:10.1523/
jneurosci.2896-16.2017.
Branco, T., & Staras, K. (2009). The probability of neurotransmitter release: variability and feedback control at single synapses.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10 , 373–383. doi:10.1038/nrn2634.
Branstetter, B. K., Finneran, J. J., Fletcher, E. A., Weisman, B. C., & Ridgway, S. H. (2012). Dolphins can maintain
vigilant behavior through echolocation for 15 days without interruption or cognitive impairment. PloS One, 7 , e47478.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047478.
Bucher, D., Guidoni, L., Carloni, P., & Rothlisberger, U. (2010). Coordination numbers of K+ and Na+ ions inside the
selectivity filter of KcsA potassium channel: insights from first principles molecular dynamics. Biophysical Journal , 98 ,
L47–L49. doi:10.1016/j.bpj.2010.01.064.
Bucher, D., & Rothlisberger, U. (2010). Molecular simulations of ion channels: a quantum chemist’s perspective. Journal of
General Physiology, 135 , 549–554. doi:10.1085/jgp.201010404.
Busch, P. (1997). Is the quantum state (an) observable? Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 194 , 61–70. doi:10.
1007/978-94-017-2732-7_5.
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Rautenbach, H., Förtsch, H. E. A., Bornman, M. S. R., & Hayes, V. M. (2019). Human origins in a southern African
palaeo-wetland and first migrations. Nature, 575 , 185–189. doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1714-1.
Chancey, C. C., George, S. A., & Marshall, P. J. (1992). Calculations of quantum tunnelling between closed and open states
of sodium channels. Journal of Biological Physics, 18 , 307–321. doi:10.1007/bf00419427.
Chen, C. Y., Chen, C. J., & Tseng, Y. C. (2017). A case report of transient cortical blindness after angiography. The
Neurologist , 22 , 82–84. doi:10.1097/nrl.0000000000000115.
21
Coleman, S. (2012). Mental chemistry: combination for panpsychists. Dialectica, 66 , 137–166. doi:doi:10.1111/j.1746-
8361.2012.01293.x.
Conway, J. H., & Kochen, S. B. (2006). The free will theorem. Foundations of Physics, 36 , 1441–1473. doi:10.1007/s10701-
006-9068-6.
Conway, J. H., & Kochen, S. B. (2009). The strong free will theorem. Notices of the AMS , 56 , 226–232.
Crane, T., & Brewer, B. (1995). Mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 69 ,
211–253.
Darwin, C. (2006). From So Simple a Beginning: The Four Great Books of Charles Darwin (The Voyage of the Beagle, On
the Origin of Species, The Descent of Man, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals). New York: W. W.
Norton & Company.
Dawkins, R. (2004). The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Life. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained . New York: Back Bay Books.
Destexhe, A., & Contreras, D. (2006). Neuronal computations with stochastic network states. Science, 314 , 85–90. doi:10.
1126/science.1127241.
Dirac, P. A. M. (1967). The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dobelle, W. H. (2000). Artificial vision for the blind by connecting a television camera to the visual cortex. ASAIO Journal ,
46 , 3–9. doi:10.1097/00002480-200001000-00002.
Dobrunz, L. E., & Stevens, C. F. (1997). Heterogeneity of release probability, facilitation, and depletion at central synapses.
Neuron, 18 , 995–1008. doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(00)80338-4.
Elga, A. (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69 , 383–396.
doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00400.x.
Elgabarty, H., Kampfrath, T., Bonthuis, D. J., Balos, V., Kaliannan, N. K., Loche, P., Netz, R. R., Wolf, M., Kühne, T. D., &
Sajadi, M. (2020). Energy transfer within the hydrogen bonding network of water following resonant terahertz excitation.
Science Advances, 6 , eaay7074. doi:10.1126/sciadv.aay7074.
Fayer, M. D. (2012). Dynamics of water interacting with interfaces, molecules, and ions. Accounts of Chemical Research, 45 ,
3–14. doi:10.1021/ar2000088.
Fayngold, M., & Fayngold, V. (2013). Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-VCH.
Feynman, R. P. (1948). Space-time approach to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics, 20 , 367–387.
doi:10.1103/RevModPhys.20.367.
Feynman, R. P. (2014). QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., & Sands, M. L. (2013). The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Volume III. Quantum Mechanics.
Pasadena, California: California Institute of Technology. URL: http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/.
Flood, E., Boiteux, C., Lev, B., Vorobyov, I., & Allen, T. W. (2019). Atomistic simulations of membrane ion channel conduction,
gating, and modulation. Chemical Reviews, 119 , 7737–7832. doi:10.1021/acs.chemrev.8b00630.
Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind–body problem. Scientific American, 244 , 114–123. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0181-114.
Foley, J. J., & Mazziotti, D. A. (2013). Cage versus prism: electronic energies of the water hexamer. Journal of Physical
Chemistry A, 117 , 6712–6716. doi:10.1021/jp405739d.
Garcia, P. S., Kolesky, S. E., & Jenkins, A. (2010). General anesthetic actions on GABAA receptors. Current Neuropharma-
cology, 8 , 2–9. doi:10.2174/157015910790909502.
Gasparini, S., Migliore, M., & Magee, J. C. (2004). On the initiation and propagation of dendritic spikes in CA1 pyramidal
neurons. Journal of Neuroscience, 24 , 11046–11056. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2520-04.2004.
Gazzaniga, M. S. (2002). The split brain revisited. Scientific American, 12 , 26–31.
Gazzaniga, M. S., Bogen, J. E., & Sperry, R. W. (1962). Some functional effects of sectioning the cerebral commissures in man.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 48 , 1765–1769.
Gazzaniga, M. S., & Sperry, R. W. (1967). Language after section of the cerebral commissures. Brain, 90 , 131–148. doi:10.
1093/brain/90.1.131.
Georgescu, I. (2014). Bell’s theorem: Closing the loopholes. Nature Physics, 10 , 248. doi:10.1038/nphys2945.
Georgiev, D. D. (2013). Quantum no-go theorems and consciousness. Axiomathes, 23 , 683–695. doi:10.1007/s10516-012-
9204-1.
Georgiev, D. D. (2015). Monte Carlo simulation of quantum Zeno effect in the brain. International Journal of Modern Physics
B , 29 , 1550039. doi:10.1142/S0217979215500393.
Georgiev, D. D. (2017). Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction. Boca Raton: CRC Press. doi:10.
1201/9780203732519.
Georgiev, D. D. (2019). Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless
spectator of its own drama. Activitas Nervosa Superior , 61 , 159–164. doi:10.1007/s41470-019-00062-z.
Georgiev, D. D. (2020). Inner privacy of conscious experiences and quantum information. Biosystems, 187 , 104051. doi:10.
1016/j.biosystems.2019.104051.
Georgiev, D. D., & Cohen, E. (2018). Probing finite coarse-grained virtual Feynman histories with sequential weak values.
Physical Review A, 97 , 052102. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.97.052102.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2007). Subneuronal processing of information by solitary waves and stochastic processes.
In S. E. Lyshevski (Ed.), Nano and Molecular Electronics Handbook Nano and Microengineering Series chapter 17. (pp.
1–41). Boca Raton: CRC Press. doi:10.1201/9781315221670.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2010). SNARE proteins as molecular masters of interneuronal communication. Biomedical
Reviews, 21 , 17–23. doi:10.14748/bmr.v21.43.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2012). Quasiparticle tunneling in neurotransmitter release. In W. A. Goddard III,
22
D. Brenner, S. E. Lyshevski, & G. J. Iafrate (Eds.), Handbook of Nanoscience, Engineering, and Technology Electrical
Engineering Handbook chapter 30. (pp. 983–1016). Boca Raton: CRC Press. (3rd ed.). doi:10.1201/b11930-37.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2014). Quantum interactive dualism: From Beck and Eccles tunneling model of exocytosis
to molecular biology of SNARE zipping. Biomedical Reviews, 25 , 15–24. doi:10.14748/bmr.v25.1038.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2018). The quantum physics of synaptic communication via the SNARE protein complex.
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 135 , 16–29. doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2018.01.006.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2019a). On the quantum dynamics of Davydov solitons in protein α-helices. Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 517 , 257–269. doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.11.026.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2019b). Quantum tunneling of Davydov solitons through massive barriers. Chaos,
Solitons and Fractals, 123 , 275–293. doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.04.013.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2020a). Launching of Davydov solitons in protein α-helix spines. Physica E: Low-
dimensional Systems and Nanostructures, 124 , 114332. doi:10.1016/j.physe.2020.114332.
Georgiev, D. D., & Glazebrook, J. F. (2020b). Quantum transport and utilization of free energy in protein α-helices. Advances
in Quantum Chemistry, 82 , 253–300. doi:10.1016/bs.aiq.2020.02.001.
Gillig, P. M. (2009). Dissociative identity disorder: a controversial diagnosis. Psychiatry, 6 , 24–29.
Giraudo, C. G., Eng, W. S., Melia, T. J., & Rothman, J. E. (2006). A clamping mechanism involved in SNARE-dependent
exocytosis. Science, 313 , 676–680. doi:10.1126/science.1129450.
Glowatzki, E., & Fuchs, P. A. (2002). Transmitter release at the hair cell ribbon synapse. Nature Neuroscience, 5 , 147.
doi:10.1038/nn796.
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (2002). The “psychic cell” of Ramón y Cajal. Progress in Brain Research, 136 , 427–434. doi:10.1016/
S0079-6123(02)36035-7.
de Gosson, M. A. (2018). Quantum harmonic analysis of the density matrix. Quanta, 7 , 74–110. doi:10.12743/quanta.v7i1.74.
Gudder, S. (2020). A theory of entanglement. Quanta, 9 , 7–15. doi:10.12743/quanta.v9i1.115.
Hadid, V., & Lepore, F. (2017). From cortical blindness to conscious visual perception: theories on neuronal networks and
visual training strategies. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 11 , 64. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2017.00064.
Hameroff, S. R., & Penrose, R. (2014). Consciousness in the universe: a review of the ‘Orch OR’ theory. Physics of Life
Reviews, 11 , 39–78. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2013.08.002.
Hayashi, M., Ishizaka, S., Kawachi, A., Kimura, G., & Ogawa, T. (2015). Introduction to Quantum Information Science.
Graduate Texts in Physics. Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-43502-1.
Helgaker, T., Jorgensen, P., & Olsen, J. (2013). Molecular Electronic-Structure Theory. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Herring, B. E., Xie, Z., Marks, J., & Fox, A. P. (2009). Isoflurane inhibits the neurotransmitter release machinery. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 102 , 1265–1273. doi:10.1152/jn.00252.2009.
Hiremath, S. V., Tyler-Kabara, E. C., Wheeler, J. J., Moran, D. W., Gaunt, R. A., Collinger, J. L., Foldes, S. T., Weber, D. J.,
Chen, W., Boninger, M. L., & Wang, W. (2017). Human perception of electrical stimulation on the surface of somatosensory
cortex. PLOS ONE , 12 , e0176020. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0176020.
Holevo, A. S. (1973). Bounds for the quantity of information transmitted by a quantum communication channel. Problems of
Information Transmission, 9 , 177–183.
Holevo, A. S. (1998). Quantum coding theorems. Russian Mathematical Surveys, 53 , 1295–1331. doi:10.1070/
rm1998v053n06abeh000091.
Holevo, A. S. (2001). Statistical Structure of Quantum Theory. Lecture Notes in Physics. Springer. doi:10.1007/3-540-44998-1.
Horodecki, R., Horodecki, P., Horodecki, M., & Horodecki, K. (2009). Quantum entanglement. Reviews of Modern Physics,
81 , 865–942. doi:10.1103/RevModPhys.81.865.
Hublin, J.-J., Ben-Ncer, A., Bailey, S. E., Freidline, S. E., Neubauer, S., Skinner, M. M., Bergmann, I., Le Cabec, A., Benazzi,
S., Harvati, K., & Gunz, P. (2017). New fossils from Jebel Irhoud, Morocco and the pan-African origin of Homo sapiens.
Nature, 546 , 289–292. doi:10.1038/nature22336.
Hudetz, A. G., & Imas, O. A. (2007). Burst activation of the cerebral cortex by flash stimuli during isoflurane anesthesia in
rats. Anesthesiology, 107 , 983–991. doi:10.1097/01.anes.0000291471.80659.55.
Hughston, L. P., Jozsa, R., & Wootters, W. K. (1993). A complete classification of quantum ensembles having a given density
matrix. Physics Letters A, 183 , 14–18. doi:10.1016/0375-9601(93)90880-9.
Imas, O. A., Ropella, K. M., Ward, B. D., Wood, J. D., & Hudetz, A. G. (2005). Volatile anesthetics enhance flash-induced γ
oscillations in rat visual cortex. Anesthesiology, 102 , 937–947.
Ingólfsson, H. I., Arnarez, C., Periole, X., & Marrink, S. J. (2016). Computational ‘microscopy’ of cellular membranes. Journal
of Cell Science, 129 , 257–268. doi:10.1242/jcs.176040.
Ishida, T., Fedorov, D. G., & Kitaura, K. (2006). All electron quantum chemical calculation of the entire enzyme system
confirms a collective catalytic device in the chorismate mutase reaction. Journal of Physical Chemistry B , 110 , 1457–1463.
doi:10.1021/jp0557159.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32 , 127–136. doi:10.2307/2960077.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy, 83 , 291–295. doi:10.2307/2026143.
Jackson, F. (1996). Mental causation. Mind , 105 , 377–413.
James, W. (1879). Are we automata? Mind , 4 , 1–22. doi:10.1093/mind/os-4.13.1.
Jensen, F. H., Rocco, A., Mansur, R. M., Smith, B. D., Janik, V. M., & Madsen, P. T. (2013). Clicking in shallow rivers:
short-range echolocation of Irrawaddy and Ganges river dolphins in a shallow, acoustically complex habitat. PLoS One, 8 ,
e59284. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059284.
Johansson, J. S., Scharf, D., Davies, L. A., Reddy, K. S., & Eckenhoff, R. G. (2000). A designed four-α-helix bundle that
binds the volatile general anesthetic halothane with high affinity. Biophysical Journal , 78 , 982–993. doi:10.1016/S0006-
23
3495(00)76656-2.
Johnson, J. B. (1928). Thermal agitation of electricity in conductors. Physical Review , 32 , 97–109. doi:10.1103/PhysRev.32.97.
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Stöhr, M., & Tkatchenko, A. (2019). Quantum mechanics of proteins in explicit water: the role of plasmon-like solute-solvent
interactions. Science Advances, 5 , eaax0024. doi:10.1126/sciadv.aax0024.
Strang, W. G. (2016). Introduction to Linear Algebra. (5th ed.). Wellesley, Massachusetts: Wellesley-Cambridge Press.
Stringer, C., & Galway-Witham, J. (2017). On the origin of our species. Nature, 546 , 212–214. doi:10.1038/546212a.
Su, N. Q., & Xu, X. (2017). Development of new density functional approximations. Annual Review of Physical Chemistry,
68 , 155–182. doi:10.1146/annurev-physchem-052516-044835.
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